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This article aims to assess the economic issues related to the accounting treatment of goodwill, and
more specifically the likely repercussions of the transition to International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) on the consolidated accounts of listed companies with effect from 1 January 2005.
Based on observations derived from a representative database of French groups, the article
demonstrates a marked increase in the amount of goodwill and similar intangible assets in the
balance sheets of large groups, and especially of CAC 40 groups, for whom the ratio of such assets to
equity reached 82% in 2002.
The difficulties experienced in some sectors, especially telecoms and media, led some groups to
record substantial write-downs of goodwill and similar intangibles, leading to huge accounting losses
being reported in 2001 and 2002.
The gearing of these groups, which had risen as a result of external growth strategies partly based
on debt financing, then increased further due to the contraction in equity caused by these losses.
Hence the observation of a deterioration in balance sheet structure in 2002, extending into 2003.
In the light of these observations, can accounting standards yield information that accurately reflects
deterioration in a company’s financial structure as early as possible?
In view of the rapid developments in recent years described in this article, the question of whether or
not to amortise goodwill is no longer a relevant issue. Nevertheless, in a broader perspective, the
virtual disappearance of goodwill amortisation that is likely to result from the adoption of IFRS
could, in an economic downturn, induce greater volatility in financial statements, at the level of both
earnings and equity. This is because downward adjustments of valuations are likely to take the form
of one-off charges rather than being spread over time.
Notwithstanding this potential additional volatility, the approach recommended by IFRS 3 on business
combinations nonetheless gives financial statement users important information about changes in
the wealth of a group during an economic downturn, and indicates any loss of that wealth due to
over-priced acquisitions.
Recognition of goodwill as a separate asset thus has the effect of highlighting the potential fragility of
corporate wealth which is based partly on goodwill. Furthermore, it contributes to the general drive
towards greater international comparability of accounting standards.
.../...Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
128 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 4 • June 2004
2 0 0 2 r a e Y
s p u o r g f o r e b m u Ns e e y o l p m Es e l a S
s n o i l l i b R U E
s t e s s a l a t o T
s n o i l l i b R U E
y t i u q E
s n o i l l i b R U E
n o i t a l u p o P 0 4 C A C4 30 0 0 , 9 1 3 , 20 7 73 2 90 4 2
s p u o r g r e h t O 5 1 5 , 3 0 0 7 , 4 6 9 , 1 9 1 9 0 5 1 , 1 1 4 2
. e s a b a t a d s t n u o c c a d e t a d i l o s n o c – e c n a r F e d e u q n a B : e c r u o S
T
he very heavy losses reported by some large
groups of companies in 2001 and especially
2002, caused largely by goodwill write-downs,
have highlighted the importance of appropriate
accounting treatment of this item in corporate
balance sheets.
This study aims to assess the economic issues related
to the accounting treatment of goodwill, and more
specifically the likely repercussions of the transition
to International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) on the consolidated accounts of listed
companies with effect from 1 January 2005.
The first part looks at the consolidated accounts of
companies for the period 1997-2002 so as to trace
the effects on balance sheet structures of acquisition
strategies, depending on the method used to finance
these strategies. The second part assesses the effects
of changes affecting certain sectors, in particular
telecoms and media, in which companies built up
substantial amounts of goodwill only to be forced to
write it down and sell off assets in a bid to restore
the soundness of their balance sheets. The final part
focuses on the different methods of accounting for
goodwill under current French standards and IFRS
in order to stress, in the light of our earlier
observations, the implications of the adoption of
IFRS from 2005.
The data used in this study are derived from the
consolidated balance sheet database maintained by
the Companies Directorate of the Banque de France.
This database comprised 2,700 records in 1997, and
3,700 in 2002. It only contains industrial and
commercial enterprises; financial institutions and
insurance companies are excluded. We extracted two
data series from the database. The first covers the
largest groups, which are included in the CAC 40
(or were during the period under review). The
second series comprises the remainder of the groups
in the database.
The decision to use these two populations reflects
the rather unusual profile of CAC 40 companies in
terms of their size and international exposure, and
the fact that their method of financing relies
primarily on the financial markets. A further benefit
is that the two populations are broadly similar as
regards their overall economic weight.
However, impairment tests cannot always rely on market prices. There is no guarantee that there
will be a deep and liquid market in assets comparable with those that generated the goodwill, and
the more specific the asset and the longer the period since acquisition, the more this will apply. It
therefore becomes necessary to devise hypotheses, which provide some latitude in the choice of
valuations.
Moreover, the extent of impairment losses may in itself send out a strong signal, leading to a reappraisal
of expectations and share prices. This could trigger a downward spiral, which could only be contained
in an efficient market.
In the final analysis, the impact of the reform of the accounting treatment of business combinations,
and of goodwill arising on such combinations, will largely hinge on how the preparers of financial
statements apply IFRS 3, and on the scrutiny brought to bear on the accuracy and meaning of the
figures by auditors and analysts. Users will no doubt be able to place more reliance on financial
statement preparation and analysis in sectors where only a few large groups have goodwill in their
balance sheets, making comparisons between groups easier. Information will be harder to assess
where valuations of goodwill and intangibles relate to highly specific or relatively new activities.Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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Box 1
A definition of goodwill
Goodwill is an asset recognised in consolidated balance sheets. It represents the difference arising on the
first-time consolidation of an acquired company between the acquisition cost of the shares in that company and
the fair value of its assets and liabilities on the acquisition date. In other words, it is the differential between the
book value of a company's net assets, adjusted for any revaluations, and what a group is prepared to pay to
acquire that company. Goodwill arises largely because of the difficulty of reflecting certain aspects of a company,
such as human capital or negotiating power, in accounting terms.
From an economic standpoint, the main justification for recognising goodwill is that it represents an expected
return or cost savings from the acquired company. Hence the very substantial amounts of goodwill recognised
in the new information and communication technology sectors were in line with hopes that the target companies
would deliver very large profits.
Intangible assets derived from acquisitions, such as brands or market share, are analogous to goodwill – so
much so that it can be very difficult to distinguish between them. The IASB's new IFRS 3 standard on business
combinations does offer a degree of clarification in this area by laying down two criteria, one relating to the
existence of legal or contractual rights, and the other to the separability of the asset. Nonetheless, determining
the value of these assets remains a difficult exercise based, like goodwill itself, on the expected return or cost
savings from the acquired company.
For simplicity's sake, we have used the term “broad goodwill” to cover not only goodwill in the pure accounting
sense as recognised in consolidated balance sheets (i.e. the excess of acquisition cost over fair value of net assets
acquired), but also other intangible assets related to acquisitions.1
Breakdown of the difference between acquisition cost and the book value of the acquired company:
Net assets 
(book value)
Revalued net assets Acquisition cost




Goodwill (excess of acquisition
cost over fair value of net assets)
e.g.
•   Unrealised capital gain 
    on real estate
•   Realisable  
     value of inventories > book value
e.g.
•   brands
•   customer lists
•   market share
•   expected increase in future profits
•   expected synergies
•   result of negotiation
Broad goodwill
1 Such as brands, market share, customer lists, etc.
The study combines two approaches, the first based on
average ratios and the second on the distribution of
individual ratios around the median and quartiles. The
first of these approaches gives an indication of the size
of the deals carried out by the groups as a whole, but is
heavily influenced by trends specific to the largest
groups. The second approach aims to assess the diversity
of the groups' behaviour by attaching equal weight to
each of them, thereby giving a better understanding of
the practices adopted by companies generally.Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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1| Balance sheet deterioration associated
with external growth strategies
1 “Broad goodwill” also includes intangibles associated with acquisitions: see explanation in the introduction.
2 However, the amortisation period varies widely under French accounting standards, and may be as much as 40 years, thereby eroding the effect
of the distinction between goodwill and intangible assets.
1|1 Marked increase in goodwill,
driven by a few very large
listed groups
The external growth strategies followed by large
industrial and commercial groups led to a surge
in the amount of goodwill and other intangibles1
in balance sheets between 1997 and 2002.
The proportion of broad goodwill to equity doubled
for the CAC 40 population, the average ratio rising
from 40% to 82%. The trend for other groups was
similar but much more modest: broad goodwill rose




CAC 40 and other groups
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Broad goodwill: CAC 40
Broad goodwill: other groups
Goodwill CAC 40
Goodwill other groups
Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
Within the CAC 40 population, this surge in goodwill
and intangibles, notwithstanding a particularly
marked effect in a few very large groups in the
sample, is a fairly widespread phenomenon. The
median ratio of broad goodwill to equity rose from
46% to 64% during the period under review. In the
more recent years, broad goodwill actually exceeded
equity for a quarter of the sample groups.
By contrast, the vast majority of the other groups
in the database show stable broad goodwill over
the period. However, only just over half of these
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Median: CAC 40
Median: other groups
3rd quartile: CAC 40
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Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
So while the median value of broad goodwill was
close to 2/3 of equity for the CAC 40 population in
2002, it was only 14% of equity for the other groups
in the same year. However, this relatively modest
figure conceals a fairly wide dispersion, with a
quarter of the “other groups” population showing a
ratio of over 47% for the last four years of the period.
Under French accounting standards, the decision
as to whether to treat the excess of acquisition cost
over net assets acquired as goodwill or as identifiable
intangible assets has significant implications for
corporate earnings. This is because any amount not
allocated to identifiable intangible assets but
recognised as goodwill must be systematically
amortised,2 depressing future profits. By contrast,
intangible assets are not subject to amortisation, and
hence do not affect earnings unless a one-off
impairment loss is recognised. On this point, withinGoodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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the CAC 40 population nearly 2/3 of all excess of
acquisition cost over net assets is not allocated to
intangible assets. Interestingly, however, the higher
the ratio of broad goodwill to equity, the greater the
proportion allocated to intangible assets.
It is also worth noting that the overall proportion of
broad goodwill would have been even greater had
not some large mergers (Total, Petrofina and Elf;
Cap Gemini and Ernst & Young) been accounted
for using the pooling of interests method.
This involves offsetting the excess of acquisition cost
over the fair value of net assets acquired against
equity, which means that no goodwill is shown in
the balance sheet (see section 3.1.).
1|2 Deterioration in balance sheets
due to extensive use
of debt financing
for external growth purposes
External growth strategies are funded either by debt
or by equity issuance, or more usually by a
combination of the two. The mechanism of
consolidation is such that a mix of debt and equity
financing will almost always increase gearing.
This is because post-acquisition equity will still
consist solely of the equity of the acquiror (including
any new share issue), but the post-acquisition debt
figure will be the sum total of the debt of all the
consolidated companies plus any debt contracted
to fund the acquisition.
Chart 3
Net debt and equity
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Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
The increase in both net debt and equity shows that
CAC 40 companies financed acquisitions using a mix
of debt and equity issuance. As could be expected,
debt rose faster than equity, driving average gearing
sharply upwards (from 54% to 96%) between 1997
and 2002.
Despite the fall in outstanding debt during 2002,
average gearing continued to rise as the result of an
even more pronounced fall in equity. This was due
to write-downs of goodwill and intangibles, plus
negative movements in translation differences on
foreign subsidiaries and, in some cases, losses on
divestment of financial assets.
The average gearing of other groups increased to a
much lesser extent, from 95% in 1997 to 100% in 2002.
Chart 4
Net gearing
CAC 40 and other groups
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Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
The median gearing for groups outside the CAC 40
population shows little variation during the period
under review, ranging from 55% to 60%. By contrast,
the median gearing for the CAC 40 groups shows a
marked uptrend. While it was significantly lower
than the median ratio for the other groups at the
start of the period, it caught up in 1999 and moved
well ahead in 2001, before ending the period at a
comparable level.
However, the other groups show wider dispersion
in gearing than the CAC 40 population. In 2002, the
most heavily indebted quartile of groups had net
gearing of over 140%. This compares with less than
100% for the most heavily indebted quartile of the
CAC 40 population over the whole period (with the
exception of 2000).Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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Box 2
The Banque de France consolidated balance sheet database
As part of its work assessing French companies, at both microeconomic and macroeconomic level, the Banque
de France analyses issues relating to membership of a group of companies. This led to the creation in 1992 of a
database containing the consolidated accounts of non-financial groups. The Bank's branches collect these balance
sheets from companies and enter the figures into the database, while at the same time checking the accounting
methods used so as to ensure that the data are consistent. The database includes a large number of groups
required to file consolidated accounts, as well as smaller groups. The number of balance sheets collected has
gradually increased over the years.
The table below shows the number of groups included in the consolidated accounts database. While the increase
in the number of groups to some extent reflects the collection of more consolidated balance sheets, it also reflects
the proliferation of group structures in the productive sector over recent years, largely as a result of external
growth strategies pursued by groups.
e s a b a t a d e c n a r F e d e u q n a b e h t n i s p u o r g f o r e b m u N
s p u o r g f o r e b m u N
s e l a s y b d e t n e m g e S
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s n o i l l i m 0 0 2 > s e l a S4 6 83 7 92 4 0 , 17 3 0 , 10 6 0 , 10 2 0 , 1
s n o i l l i m 0 0 2 < t e s n o i l l i m 0 3 > s e l a S9 5 2 , 16 0 4 , 18 9 5 , 10 4 7 , 11 4 9 , 16 3 9 , 1
s n o i l l i m 0 3 < s e l a S2 1 61 5 65 8 63 2 71 6 77 6 7
l a t o T5 3 7 , 20 3 0 , 35 2 3 , 30 0 5 , 32 6 7 , 33 2 7 , 3
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2| In some sectors, groups have been forced into massive
goodwill write-downs and balance sheet restructuring
2|1 A sharp fall in earnings for
some large groups, due mainly
to goodwill write-downs
Contrary to the performance that might have been
expected during an economic slowdown, corporate
operating margins held steady in 2001 and 2002. On
the other hand, the CAC 40 population shows a
pronounced decline in net earnings before (and
especially after) amortisation of goodwill, to the
extent that net income fell to zero in 2001 and moved








1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Operating income (with finance leases capitalised)
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This trend was largely driven by the biggest groups,
which downgraded their forecasts of earnings from
recent acquisitions without, in the majority of cases,
seeing any decline in overall operating profitability.
It should be noted that the write-downs related not
only to goodwill, but also to intangible assets. Indeed,
most of the decline in earnings before goodwill
amortisation was due to write-downs of intangibles.
The deterioration in net financial items – due to
impairment of investments, foreign exchange losses,
higher interest charges and a drop in investment
income – seems to have been only a secondary factor.
Median ratios, however, give a different picture. The
fall in net earnings in 2001 and 2002 was less marked
for the CAC 40 population, and was only partly due
to write-downs of goodwill and intangibles. The main
cause of the drop in net earnings seems to have
been difficulties at foreign subsidiaries, especially
in South America and South-East Asia, and more
recently in the United States
Chart 6
Net earnings before & after goodwill amortisation/ sales
CAC 40 and other groups
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Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
Unlike the CAC 40 sample, the other groups show,
in median value terms, relatively stable earnings
over the  period as a whole. Nonetheless, the CAC
40 companies continue to outperform the other
groups, with return on sales ratios fluctuating
between 3% and 6%, compared with barely 2% for
the other groups.
The average return on capital employed (net
income/ capital employed) for the CAC 40 groups,
having risen from 4.5% in 1997 to 6.5% in 2000,
deteriorated at the end of the period (-3.5% in 2002).
Return on equity (net income to equity) varied
between 9% in 1997 and 11.1% in 2000, but became
negative in 2001 and 2002 (-9%).
The other groups marginally underperformed the
CAC 40 groups at the start of the period, but
remained stable over the six-year period, with a
return on capital employed of about 2% and a return
on equity of about 7%.
The write-downs recorded by the CAC 40 groups
were reflected in their balance sheets by a big drop
in the impairment ratio of goodwill (net vs. gross
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Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
In the case of the other groups (around half of which
recognise goodwill as an asset), the impairment ratio
increased from 72% in 1997 to 77.2% in 2000, before
gradually easing again to 73.4% in 2002.
2|2 Major divestments aimed
at restoring balance sheets
to soundness and meeting debt
repayment obligations
While writing down goodwill and intangibles may
result in substantial accounting losses, it has no
impact on cash flows. However, the downward
revisions of future cash flow expectations which
underlie these write-downs may, if they are big
enough, point up a mismatch between the amount
of debt in the balance sheet and the company's
ability to generate the cash needed to service its
debt. In practical terms, a company may in suchGoodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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3 A decline accentuated by negative movements in translation differences on foreign subsidiaries, due to adverse exchange rate developments for
euro-zone groups.
circumstances face difficulties refinancing its debt
and hence be forced, provided it has the means, to
reduce its debt by selling off assets.
This process, which starts with goodwill write-downs
and leads to an increase in gearing and potentially
to cash-flow problems, highlights the risk incurred
by companies when they resort to debt financing
for external growth purposes.
Chart 8
Financial investment & divestment/total assets
CAC 40 and other groups
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Source: Banque de France – consolidated accounts database
Trends in investment and divestment of financial
assets for the CAC 40 population show a very uneven
profile. Initially, in 1999 and 2000, investments were
running at a very high level, exceeding 11% of total
assets in 2000. Then followed a period of reduction
in investment combined with increased
divestments, culminating in 2002 when investments
in financial assets were balanced by divestments.
By contrast, investment in tangible and intangible
assets remained fairly stable over the period,
fluctuating between 4.5% and 6% of total assets, with
disposals at around 1%.
The pattern of investment and divestment for the
other groups was similar, but the fluctuations were
much less marked. In 2000, the increase in financial
investment rose to nearly 7% of total assets, while
in 2001-2002 divestments were close to 4% of total
assets, double the levels at the start of the period.
2|3 The situation at the end of the
period gives an indication
for 2003 for the largest groups
Between 1998 and 2000, the CAC 40 groups made
major acquisitions, especially in new technologies.
This led to the recognition of ever-larger amounts of
goodwill and intangibles in balance sheets.
In 2001-2002, it emerged that profit forecasts for
acquired companies had often been heavily
overestimated. The CAC 40 groups were therefore
forced to take substantial write-downs of goodwill and
intangibles on these companies. At the end of 2002,
despite maintaining a high level of operating
performance, several of the biggest CAC 40 groups
showed deteriorated balance sheets as a result of the
lower than expected returns yielded by acquisitions.
The same applies to the other groups as a whole,
although the most pronounced trends (as in the case
of the CAC 40 companies) are attributable to a
minority of groups with a heavy weighting in the
sample. In addition, the fluctuations are much less
marked for groups outside the CAC 40.
Despite substantial write-downs in 2001 and 2002,
broad goodwill is still rising relative to equity as a
result of the decline in equity3 (see chart 1). Gearing
is also still rising, for the same reason (see chart 3).
So, write-downs of goodwill and other intangibles,
which were intended to restore corporate balance
sheets to soundness, are only a first phase, prior to
the almost inevitable process of debt reduction upon
which a number of large groups have yet to embark.
In addition, the end-2002 level of broad goodwill in
balance sheets still looks very high, both for CAC 40
groups and for other groups, at 82% and 38% of
equity respectively.
During 2003, we saw some further substantial
write-downs. Divestments of financial assets are still
sizeable, while investments remain at low levels.
Overall, debt reduction continued during 2003,
though with the equity base again contracting this
has not led to a drop in gearing.Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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In the light of these observations, what is the role of
accounting standards in delivering information that
might provide an early warning of the risk of
deterioration in corporate balance sheets?
3|1 French accounting standards
are relatively flexible
French accounting standards offer a degree of choice
in accounting for acquisitions.
– Subject to a number of conditions (the main one
being that consideration for capital infusion must
be primarily in the form of shares), a company
making an acquisition may opt to use the pooling
of interests method as an alternative treatment.
Under this method, differences (goodwill and
other valuation adjustments) between acquisition
cost and book value are offset immediately
against equity. This has two advantages for the
company. First, the issue of goodwill
amortisation does not arise, thereby protecting
future earnings. Second, there is only a marginal
impact on gearing: the share issue usually cancels
out the reduction in equity caused by the
immediate offsetting of the goodwill.
In practice, the requirement that the acquisition
be paid for primarily by issuing shares severely
restricts the number of companies able to opt
for this approach.
– The standard treatment is the purchase method
of accounting. This method also offers companies
a degree of latitude, firstly in how the excess of
acquisition cost over the fair value of net assets
is split between non-depreciable intangibles
(brands, market share, commercial sites, etc) and
goodwill, and secondly in deciding on the
goodwill amortisation period. French standards
also provide for the recognition of impairment
losses in order to avoid goodwill and intangibles
remaining in the balance sheet at more than their
economic value.
This latitude enables companies, with approval
from their auditors, to cushion the impact of
acquisitions on future earnings. In financial
3| Implications of adopting IFRS standards on goodwill
reporting terms, the goodwill amortisation charge
is shown on a separate line above net income,
enabling companies to report an earnings figure




Under the new IFRS 3 on business combinations,
adopted by the IASB during the first quarter of 2004
to replace the old IAS 22, only the purchase method
is allowed.
Allocation of the excess of acquisition cost over the
fair value of net assets acquired is subject to tighter
restrictions than under French standards. Intangible
assets may not be recognised on a separate line from
goodwill unless they are covered by legal or
contractual rights, or are separately identifiable.
Unlike under French standards, goodwill is not
amortised. Conversely, intangibles recognised as having
a finite useful life are amortised over that period.
The absence of any practical experience of
companies applying these standards makes it
difficult at this stage to form a judgment as to their
precise impact. That said, other things being
equal, this accounting method could in the
medium term lead to substantial increases in the
amount of broad goodwill in the balance sheet.
This is because the restrictions on the recognition
of separately identifiable intangible assets
(see above) are liable to reduce the amounts
classified as intangible assets, thereby
significantly reducing the amount of broad
goodwill subject to systematic amortisation.
The international standard builds in the principle
of impairment tests. These involve reassessing the
value of goodwill and intangibles annually by
reference to indicators of impairment in value, such
as the market value of the acquired company, the
situation of markets in which that company
operates, or the level of interest rates. In theory,
this provides a safeguard against goodwill and other
intangibles being shown in the balance sheet at more
than their economic value.Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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Given that in the vast majority of cases goodwill
has no market value, impairment tests are based
on a discounted cash flow approach. This approach
builds in growth forecasts and discounting
assumptions; it is inherently uncertain, and offers
considerable latitude in the way it is put into
practice. Consequently, the corrective effect that
impairment tests are expected to offer cannot be
viewed as an exact reflection of the loss of value
suffered by the company, but rather as a perception
of the potential loss of value at a specific
moment in time.
Replacing an approach that combines the systematic
amortisation of goodwill and impairment losses with
a system based essentially on impairment tests will
undoubtedly induce companies with acquisition
strategies to make significant corrections to their
financial statements much more frequently. With
no amortisation charges being booked, groups will
not recognise any expense at all in the good years,
while at the slightest downturn they may be hit by
a double blow: lower earnings as a result of tougher
economic conditions, plus charges arising from the
impairment of goodwill and other intangibles.
From a financial stability perspective, the key issue
is the potential impact on investor and lender
behaviour of the discontinuity in financial
information caused by these corrections, which as
things stand are likely primarily to depress earnings




Fixed assets, including goodwill and intangibles,
are subject to impairment tests. An impairment
loss must be recognised in the income statement
if the book value (“carrying amount”) of an asset
is greater than its recoverable amount, defined as
the greater of net selling price or value in use.
Value in use is defined as the present value of
estimated future cash flows from the continuing
use of an asset, plus any residual value at the end
of its expected useful life.
3|3 These questions feed
into the fair value debate
The switch from the old IAS 22 to IFRS 3 is linked to
the process of convergence with US standards. The
changes introduced by IFRS 3 are the outcome of a
compromise made by the US standard-setter (FASB)
in June 2001: the FASB prohibited the pooling of
interests method, which it believed was being
abused, but in return agreed to scrap goodwill
amortisation in order to avoid an excessive adverse
impact on the earnings of companies that had made
acquisitions.
Conceptually, the issue of whether or not goodwill
should be amortised is still controversial. On the
one hand, systematic amortisation charges do not
always seem wholly justified, at least as regards the
amount involved. On the other, goodwill requires
some maintenance expenditure (advertising,
promotions, research, etc.) in order to retain its
value. In other words, goodwill loses some of its
value if a company does nothing. Consequently,
failure to recognise this loss of value (via
amortisation charges) is effectively tantamount to
recognising internally-generated goodwill in the
balance sheet (reflecting the enhancement of the
future earnings capacity of the group as a whole).
However, no accounting system allows recognition
of internally-generated goodwill.
As it stands, IFRS 3 is ambivalent. On the one hand,
IFRS 3 disallows recognition of internally-generated
goodwill on the grounds that it cannot be measured
with sufficient reliability. On the other, IFRS 3 allows
companies to retain goodwill arising on acquisitions
in their balance sheets without taking account of
the fact that the more time has elapsed since the
acquisition, the more the value of the goodwill
(initially based on a market value) becomes
uncertain or even arbitrary.
In IFRS 3, the IASB acknowledges goodwill to be an
asset in its own right, the valuation of which – in
the absence of an active market – is based on
discounting future cash flows. In doing so, it
validates an asset valuation method based on
companies' expectations of future earnings. Does
this not risk creating a circular relationship between
financial information and the way such information
is perceived by the financial markets?Goodwill, balance sheet structures and accounting standards
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The disclosures on the valuation of goodwill
required in the notes to the financial statements
under IFRS, in particular disclosure of the
sensitivity of valuations to changes in growth
rates and discounting rates, would appear to give
users of accounts the scope to adjust the
valuations adopted by the group in the light of
their own judgment. More generally, it is to be
expected that the markets, and all users of
accounts, will adapt to the new rules that will
underpin the financial information published by
listed companies from 2005. But are the tools they
are being provided with appropriate? There is a
risk that the resulting fluctuations in profits, and
hence in equity, will skew the message put out
by financial statements, making it more difficult
to take long-term decisions.
These questions are part of the broader fair value
debate. In the existing accounting standards
context, they are probably among the most
sensitive issues faced by non-financial companies.
The prospect of future IASB decisions that
effectively enhance the role of fair value in
international accounting standards makes these
questions all the more pressing.
Box 4
Methodological approach and definition of variables
Populations examined
– “CAC 40” population: comprises all non-financial corporations included in the CAC 40 at least once during
the period from 1997 to 2002. In order to achieve a relatively constant sample despite significant changes in
the composition of some groups, our sample also includes spun-off and merged companies.
To avoid double-counting, CAC 40 companies consolidated by another CAC 40 company were excluded from
the sample. In total, the sample size varies between 33 and 35 groups.
– “Other groups” population: comprises all groups represented in the Banque de France consolidated balance
sheet database, except for companies included in the CAC 40 population and (to avoid double-counting) the
parent companies or subsidiaries of such groups. We have assumed that the increase in the population
during the period under review, related to the gradual enlargement of the database, has no significant
impact on our statistical findings.
Variables used
– Goodwill and broad goodwill: goodwill is shown on a separate line in French consolidated balance sheets
and hence is easily identifiable. However, broad goodwill, defined as including items analogous to goodwill
but capable of classification as intangible assets, raises the issue of how to distinguish these assets from
other intangible assets. In practice, we arrived at a figure for broad goodwill by adding together the “goodwill”
line and the “intangible assets” line, after subtracting from the latter (where this information was available)
the amounts shown for incorporation costs, research and development costs, software and patents.
In both cases, we used net values.
– Equity: this comprises shareholders' equity, including minority interests.
– Net debt: this comprises gross debt less cash and equivalents and current investments. In the interests of
consistency, debt includes a standard adjustment to bring finance lease obligations and securitised receivables
onto the balance sheet (where such information is disclosed off balance sheet).
We used net debt rather than gross debt because in our view this reflects the approach usually adopted by
the groups under review. In practice, trends in net and gross debt are broadly similar, although the amounts
are different.
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Investments and divestments: we took our investment and divestment variables from the cash flow statement
lines showing acquisitions and disposals of financial assets.
Statistical concepts
– Average ratio: the relationship between the sum total of numerators and the sum total of denominators for
all the individual ratios.
– Median: the median was obtained by sorting ratio values for the entire sample in ascending order of size.
The median value is the mid-point in this series: 50% of companies lie below the median, and 50% above it.
– Quartiles: quartiles split the distribution of a ratio into four parts, each containing 25% of the individual
values observed:
25% of companies have a ratio below the first quartile (Q1).
50% of companies have a ratio below the median quartile (Q2 or median).
75% of companies have a ratio below the upper quartile (Q3).